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CASE COMMENTS

Despite the statute the court held that the demurrer should have
been sustained because the statement unexplained by innuendo was
not defamatory and that the declaration alleged no state of facts
which would justify the meaning the plaintiff was attempting to
attach. This inconsistent position is noted in the opinion of City of
Mullens v. Davidson, supra, but the Parkercase was not overruled.
The language of Argabright v. Jones, 46 W. Va. 144, 32 S.E. 995
(1899) does not seem to fall within the statute. In this instance,
the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the decision because
of failure to sustain a demurrer. The demurrer was grounded upon
the theory that there was no basis for inferring that the statement
applied to the plaintiff. In reversing the decision, the court said:
"Looking, then, at the article as it appeared, we cannot say that
it warrants the construction sought to be placed upon it by
innuendoes." The added significance of the Argabright decision is
that the factual situation is analogous to the type of case where
the Illinois court has applied the innocent construction rule. The
similitude involves an attempt by a plaintiff not a target of the
defamation to attach defamatory meaning by innuendo.
These decisions seem to indicate a desire of the court to retain
some control over construction despite the statute. Supporting
this viewpoint is the following statement by the court in Alderson
v. Kahle, 73 W. Va. 690, 80 S.E. 1109 (1914): "The defendant is
not necessarily held to accountability for the use of words in their
technical or even ordinary meaning." The language and actions
of the West Virginia court are perhaps an indication that the court
follows the Illinois doctrine in form if not in expressed theory.
Ellen FairfaxWarder

Labor Law-Member's Right to Presence of
Counsel in Union Hearings
P,a union member, sought injunctive relief and damages from an
alleged denial of a "full and fair" hearing in a union disciplinary
proceeding. He contended that it was impossible to have had
a fair hearing because he was not permitted the presence of counsel
from outside the union membership in his behalf. P further asserted
that the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
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teed him procedural due process, which includes a right to have
counsel present at the hearing. Held, complaint dismissed. The
sixth amendment does not apply to hearings before labor unions.
Furthermore, as the union constitution prohibits outside counsel
from being present, P had no valid complaint upon which relief
could be granted. Cornelio v. Metropolitan Dist. Council of
Philadelphiaand Vicinity, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 243 F. Supp.
126 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA.) provides that with respect to disciplinary proceedings, the
constitution and by-laws of the union must not be inconsistent
with the provisions of the act. A union member must demonstrate
that the union constitution violates the LMRDA in order to get
relief. The LMRDA further provides that no member shall be fined,
suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined unless he has been
served with specific written charges, given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense and afforded a "full and fair" hearing. LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp.
V, 1959).
The union constitution and by-laws provide that the accused may
appear before the trial committee either in person or by counsel
(who shall be a member of the United Brotherhood) and shall be
entitled to be present at all times when evidence is being presented.
Constitution and Laws of the United Bhd. of Carpenters and
Joiners of America § 56(I). This provision, in effect, prohibits a
union member from having an attorney of his choice present at the
hearing.
is recommended in the AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical Practices
a member be given "fair" treatment in disciplinary proceedings.
Codes state, however, that no particular formality is required
that lawyers need not be used. AFL-CIO Codes of Ethical
Practices, in Wouimrr & AAoN, LAB oR RELAToNs AND =IE LAw
85 (2d ed. 1960).
It
that
The
and

Based on the provisions of the union constitution, the LMRDA
and the Codes of Ethical Practices, it is manifest that a valid
decision was reached by the court in the prinicpal case. Nevertheless, research has disclosed no cases deciding this precise point.
In the past, courts have been quite reluctant to interfere with
the internal affairs of voluntary associations. Often a court decision
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would only further embitter the feud. This is especially true of
disputes within fraternal and church groups. Summers, Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HA_v. L. Bxv. 1049, 1050-51
(1951). This same reluctance was early applied to labor union
disputes. Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutter Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519,
20 Atl. 492 (1890).
But the courts gradually recognized that abuse of union power
could impose hardships upon the members unless legal relief could
be obtained. The courts consequently adopted two theories upon
which to justify intervention. First, they determined that membership in a labor union is a property right and must be protected
against unlawful interference. Second, they reasoned that membership in a union arises from a contract. Thus, any improper discipline
is a breach of that contract for which the law will give relief. Summers, supra at 1051.
When the property rights of a union member are involved, he
usually can get relief in a court. In an expulsion case, one court
held that so long as the member is in good standing and has paid
all dues and assessments, he has valuable rights which will be
protected by the courts. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa.
67, 113 At. 70 (1921). Even when property rights are involved,
however, the member must first exhaust his remedies within the
union. The court will then take jurisdiction only of the questions
affecting property rights directly involved. Crutcher v. Eastern
Div., No. 321, Order of Ry. Conductors,151 Mo. App. 622, 132 S.W.
307 (1910); Elfer v. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial As'n, 179 La. 383,
154 So. 32 (1934).
Still other courts disregard the "property right theory" and base
their decisions on the "contract theory." Summers, supra at 1054.
The rationale of this theory is that the member, when joining the
union, agrees to be bound by the provisions of the constitution and
by-laws of the union. He may consent to suspension or expulsion
according to the provisions of his contract, but the courts will
order him re-instated if he is disciplined in violation of the union
constitution and by-laws. Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159, 176 N.E.
791 (1931). One court has held that even when property rights are
involved, it will make no judicial decision if the constitution and
by-laws by which the member had agreed to be governed stipulate
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an internal remedy. Mogelener v. Newark Newspaper Guild, 124
N.J. Eq. 60, 199 Atl. 56 (1938).
Usually the two theories are fused and form one theory. The
thought is that the property rights are derived from the contract.
Shadley v. Grand Lodge of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 212 Mo. App.
653, 666, 254 S.W. 363, 365 (1923). Holders of rights guaranteed
in the constitution and by-laws are entitled to the protection of the
courts if there is a threat of impairment or destruction of these
rights, as the member is dependent upon his good standing in the
union for his livelihood. Dingwall v. Amalgamated Asin of St.
Ry. Employees, 3 Cal. App. 453, 88 Pac. 597 (1906).
In the principal case, the decision was based upon the contract
theory. In one sense, the decision was not without precedent. The
Wisconsin court in State ex rel. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28
N.W.2d 349 (1947), held that the due process clauses of state and
federal constitutions do not apply to contracts between individuals.
But perhaps it could be argued that a union member is swayed by
coercion, especially in union shop states, when he enters into a
union agreement and is not fully cognizant of all the consequences.
It is conceivable that a union member would agree to almost anything in order to get a job. If so, perhaps he should be protected
by federal and state constitutional safeguards in hearings arising
from union employment.
Even if courts remain reluctant to extend constitutional guarantees to quasi-judicial proceedings, an indirect remedy may be close
at hand. The federal government's anti-poverty program indicates
a tendency to recognize the need for an attorney in many different
types of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. DAvis, ADMiNaSTRATwE LAw 182 (1965 ed.); Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons of
Legal Services-Il, 67 W. VA. L. 1Emv. 267 (1965). It seems reasonable to suggest that someday "outside" counsel may be available
to assist indigent union members at union disciplinary hearings.
If so, perhaps the unions will re-examine their "full and fair" hearing
requirements and alter their procedures to take advantage of the
situation. It is possible that in the future no one will be denied the
presence of counsel in any trial or trial-type atmosphere.

David Ray Rexroad
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